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Introduction
This Article has two parts: Part I presents my views on Moving
Toward Integration,1 and Part II examines one of the book’s policy
recommendations for furthering residential integration—exclusionaryzoning litigation—along with some of the roadblocks to this and other
pro-integration efforts erected by the Trump Administration.

I. Reflections on Moving Toward Integration
Moving Toward Integration is an impressive and challenging book
about America’s most important problem: the enduring racial divisions

†

Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky
College of Law. I thank Tim Moran and Alex Polikoff for their helpful
insights and Sarah Welling for her editorial suggestions and constant
support.

1.

Richard H. Sander et al., Moving Toward Integration: The
Past and Future of Fair Housing (2018).
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generated by over a century of segregated housing. There is much to
praise about the book and also some questions to raise.
First, the praise. The book provides a great deal of sophisticated
analysis about difficult legal and social science concepts, presented in
clear prose and with helpful graphics. The authors have done a
herculean job in gathering and presenting the relevant data, cases, and
studies. Their greatest achievement, however, is in offering new ways
of understanding this material through original research and fresh
analytic methods. Virtually every one of the book’s 500-plus pages
contains a novel idea or insight, making it the most thought-provoking
work in this field since the classic Massey & Denton study of 1993.2
The book recognizes some fundamental problems about race-based
housing segregation.3 These include that, despite the passage of the 1968
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”),4 such segregation remains severe in many
parts of the country5 and that blacks who live in racially segregated
neighborhoods suffer a variety of life-limiting, even life-threatening,
conditions likely to harm them far into the future.6 The book also shows
2.

Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, American Apartheid (1993).

3.

The book’s focus is racial segregation, although it does occasionally
comment on national-origin segregation. See, e.g., Sander et al., supra
note 1, at 279 (noting that Hispanic and Asian segregation levels “are
almost everywhere dramatically lower than they were in 1970, and . . . in
2010 [were] a full tier below that of African-Americans”); id. at 354
(addressing the question of “how the rising racial multi-polarity of
metropolitan America affects black segregation”).

4.

Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–
89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)).

5.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 43, 174, 414 (showing various
metropolitan areas’ segregation levels from 1880–1930, 1970–1980, and
1990–2010); id. at 10 (showing the average segregation levels for the sixty
largest metropolitan areas in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010).
The book generally relies of the “index of dissimilarity” method for
measuring segregation. This index uses a scale of 0.0–1.0 that is based on
the percentage of blacks who would have to move to make their
neighborhood exactly reflect the racial make-up of the overall metropolitan
area. See id. at 37–38. Using this index, the authors define “very high”
levels of segregation as communities with dissimilarity scores of above .75,
“high” as .65–.74, “moderate” as .50–.64, and “low” or “integrated” as
below 0.50. See id. at 2–4, 39.

6.

See id. at 2 (noting that “high metropolitan levels of segregation [have] a
powerful depressing effect on black outcomes” and describing some of
these outcomes); id. at 335–52 (describing recent research showing that
segregation causes a variety of bad outcomes for blacks including worse
health, stress levels, death rates, employment opportunities, earnings, and
poorer access to healthy food and good public services); id. at 350,
(concluding that lower segregation rates have “very large benefits for
[blacks] while having a neutral effect upon [whites]”); id. at 394–97 (noting
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that the generally slow national trend of de-segregation over the FHA’s
lifetime masks varying progress at different times (e.g., rapid progress
in the 1970s; much less since 1980) and in different parts of the country
(e.g., substantial progress in the West and Southwest; much less in the
North and Midwest).7 The authors also make the point that, once a
metropolitan area does move from heavily segregated to less so, it never
reverts back.8
The book’s main conclusions are that housing discrimination is no
longer a major impediment to integration9 and that, despite a slow and
that the higher rate of black versus white unemployment is much worse
in highly segregated than moderately segregated areas); id. at 403–08
(describing the higher levels of public spending and school integration that
occur in less segregated areas and concluding that “[o]n nearly every
measurable dimension, relative black outcomes are impressively
different—and better—in metropolitan areas on the lower end of the
segregation spectrum” and that far better outcomes for blacks flow from
even a “small change in segregation”).
7.

See id. at 175–98 (contrasting San Diego’s sharp reduction in segregation
with Chicago’s continuing high segregation levels in the post-FHA era and
suggesting reasons for these differences); id. at 188 (noting generally that
“housing segregation declined significantly more in the South during the
1970s than in the North”); id. at 301 (noting that, after much progress in
the 1970s, “[b]eginning in the 1980s, the [racial transition dynamic] began
to slow . . . and by the 2000s it had, for all intents and purposes, ground
to a halt”); id. at 394 (noting that “metro areas with very high segregation
. . . are evolving at a snail’s pace [and that] the rate at which AfricanAmericans in these metro areas move to outlying areas . . . seems stuck
at levels that are not likely to produce much desegregation on their own”);
id. at 414 (providing a table showing three sets of five metropolitan areas
whose segregation declines are characterized, respectively, as large (e.g.,
San Diego and Seattle), moderate (e.g., Atlanta and Dallas), and small
(e.g., New York and Chicago)).

8.

See id. at 413 (noting that no urban area whose black–white segregation
index has dropped below .70 or .65 “then experienced an increase in
segregation”).

9.

See id. at 164–65 (arguing that, due to some excellent FHA enforcement
in the early 1970s, discrimination levels had fallen “dramatically by 1977,”
with blacks by then “more likely to encounter a good deal of fair [rather
than discriminatory] treatment”); id. at 295–99 (concluding, based on
HUD’s four national tester-based studies from 1977 through 2012, that
“discrimination rates continued to fall more or less steadily . . . , in some
cases to levels . . . practically equivalent to zero,” showing “in our view,
a spectacular change in behavior over a relatively short period of time”
and that “the anti-discrimination effort has been a remarkable – and
largely unheralded – success”); id. at 409 (arguing that fair housing
litigation “over the past fifty years has . . . succeeded in dramatically
reducing many forms of discrimination”); id. at 411 (concluding that
vigorous enforcement of the FHA in the 1970s “largely ended collective
practices of discrimination by brokers and other real estate institutions”).
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erratic record, the U.S. is winning the battle against housing
segregation.10 The book’s positive message and optimistic tone contrast
with the pessimism that, as the authors note, pervades much of the
other work in this field.11
The book takes a chronological approach, with four parts covering,
respectively, the post-Civil War period through the FHA’s passage in
1968; the first decade of the FHA’s enforcement; the remainder of the
twentieth century; and the current century. A final part, “Solutions,”
identifies twelve policy prescriptions to further reduce residential
segregation,12 which, all being financially and politically realistic,13
reinforce the authors’ sense that the progress that has been made in
achieving integration can be substantially enhanced in the coming
years. One of these proposals, banning source-of-income discrimination,
I address at length elsewhere in this volume.14 The last one, FHA-based
challenges to exclusionary zoning, I discuss in Part II of this Article.
The book’s weakest points are in some of its interpretations of the
history of fair-housing litigation. For example, the gushing treatment
of the Justice Department’s early FHA enforcement efforts is
unfathomable and inconsistent with my experience during that time.15
10.

See id. at 421 (referring to “several propitious demographic trends that
should facilitate and sustain higher rates of desegregation” in highsegregation areas); id. at 423 (asserting that there are “remarkably
favorable conditions” in most high-segregation metro areas today that
“tend to insure that increased integration will be stable and selfreinforcing”).

11.

See id. at 7 (noting that “[f]rom the 1970s until recent years, both
scholarship and politics on housing segregation have tended toward
pessimism”); id. at 458 (describing the book’s “story [as] a cautiously
optimistic one”); id. at 11 (noting that, while the authors “think the fair
housing glass is half-full,” they see a number of reasons for being “very
optimistic about the potential for new, carefully designed policies to have
powerful and beneficial effects upon black segregation levels”).

12.

See id. at 423–44.

13.

See id. at
achievable”
times”); see
a particular

14.

See Robert G. Schwemm, Source-of-Income Discrimination and the Fair
Housing Act, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 573 (2020).

15.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 145, 158 (arguing that “the most
important (and most overlooked) enforcement component [in the FHA’s
early years was] the Department of Justice” and concluding that the
“remarkable efforts of DOJ” led to “a dynamic fair housing enforcement
effort” “[d]espite HUD’s poor performance and a mixed record among
private groups”); see also id. at 173, 285, 411, 463 (describing the Justice
Department’s early enforcement efforts as “aggressive,” “highly effective,”

409 (describing these suggested policies as “eminently
and “consistent with the social and political temper of the
also id. at 449–54 (providing a modestly priced blueprint for
metropolitan area’s pursuit of these policies).
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I also find unpersuasive the book’s effort to elevate the importance of
Shelley v. Kraemer,16 the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision outlawing
court-enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.17
“vigorous,” and “creative”). This view is based almost entirely on an
interview with the then-leader of DOJ’s civil rights housing section, Frank
Schwelb (see id. at 516 n.4, 517 nn.8–9), whose insights the authors
consider “invaluable.” Id. at 561.
Mr. Schwelb’s DOJ team did bring a number of successful FHA cases, but
these tended to be sure winners that reflected a timid, rather than a
“dynamic” or “remarkable” approach. Id. at 158. Schwelb himself once
remarked to me that his Justice group had never lost a case, a comment
made with pride, but one I saw as damning of any vigorous prosecutorial
effort.
The real enforcement story of the early FHA belongs to private individuals
and groups, who were responsible for most of the early FHA cases,
including many that established key precedents and all that reached the
Supreme Court. Indeed, in the Court’s first FHA decision in 1972—a case
brought by private plaintiffs represented by private lawyers—the Justice
Department as amicus conceded that “complaints by private persons are
the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.” See
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). Other
important early examples included Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 367 (1982); see also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976)
(constitutional claim); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977) (same), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285–
86 (7th Cir. 1977) (FHA claim). This early trend has held throughout the
FHA’s history, with the major cases continuing to be brought almost
exclusively by private groups. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 38, 42, 54,
60, 75, 110, and 120.
Disclosure: In the 1970s, I was a staff attorney for Chicago’s Leadership
Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, an organization mentioned
in the book. See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 156–57. My years at
the Leadership Council led to participation in a number of important fair
housing cases, including Arlington Heights and Gladstone Realtors.
16.

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

17.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 76 (concluding, based on Shelley,
that “[t]he landscape of urban segregation almost everywhere in America
changed dramatically after 1948 [Shelley]”). The Court had essentially
upheld racial covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331–32
(1926); by the time Shelley reversed this position, the damage was done,
and real estate agents and others could easily maintain segregation by
racial steering, blockbusting, and other discriminatory practices. Indeed,
the authors acknowledge that segregation levels remained high from 1950
through 1970 (i.e., in the two decades after Shelley). See Sander et al.,
supra note 1, at 76, 174, 470. For a more detailed critique of the book’s
treatment of Shelley, see Stephen Menendian & Richard Rothstein,
Putting Integration on the Agenda, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 147, 165–69 (2019).
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These bumps in the book’s historical story, however, are not central
to its main themes. As to these themes, the points I would raise, which
challenge somewhat the authors’ optimism, include:
• Given the book’s recognition that most of the nation’s black
population still lives in “very-high-segregation areas”18 and that it will
“take generations for segregation levels in these urban areas to fall to
[moderate levels],”19 I am skeptical about the authors’ conclusion that
these high-segregation areas are assured of “increased [and selfreinforcing] integration” based on “propitious demographic trends” and
other “remarkably favorable conditions.”20
• Given the authors’ view that much of today’s segregation is
attributable to a concept they call “market failure,”21 I would have

18.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 421; see also id. at 412 (noting that most
of the metropolitan areas with the largest black populations (e.g., New
York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit) have seen only small declines
in segregation since 1970).

19.

Id. at 421; see also id. (noting that segregation levels are likely to decline
only “incrementally” in very-high-segregation urban areas).

20.

See supra note 10. The book could have provided clearer descriptions of
what these “propitious demographic trends” are and of how they are likely
to ensure future integration. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 421. For
more on demographic trends that may bode well for future integration,
see John R. Logan & Wenquan Zhang, Global Neighborhoods’
Contribution to Declining Residential Segregation, 70 Case W. Res. L.
Rev 675 (2020).
A countervailing trend, not accounted for in the book, is that, because
integration requires households to move, see supra note 5, para. 2, it may
take longer than the authors envision now that Americans are moving at
a much slower pace than in the past. See Sabrina Tavernise, Moving Vans
Idle as Migration Stalls in a Reshaped Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2019, at A1 (reporting Census Bureau data showing that Americans move
far less frequently than in the past: 9.8% of Americans moved in 2019 (the
lowest rate since the Bureau started tracking this figure in 1947) compared
to roughly 20% each year in the 1950s).

21.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 301 (noting the authors’ “theme that
much black/white housing segregation comes about because of market
failure”); id. at 174, 414, 421 (arguing that, in urban areas like Chicago
where segregation declines have been small, the “essential problem [is]
market failure” and concluding that, based on this problem, it will “take
generations for segregation levels in these urban areas to fall to [moderate
levels]”); id. at 421 (referring to “very slow desegregation rates [in certain
metro areas that are] linked to market failure”); id. at 464 (asserting that
“modern housing segregation is primarily a dead end of market failure”);
see also id. at 13 (arguing that in those metropolitan areas with few
integrated neighborhoods, this “is not a function of choices and
preferences, but of market failure in the areas that remain highly
segregated”).
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welcomed a stronger explanation of this concept and of why they
conclude it deserves such causal significance.22
• Given that the book was mostly written during the heady days
of the Obama Administration, is a re-evaluation now required after
three years of Trump’s presidency?
As to the last point, a key theme of the rest of this Article is how
reactionary the Trump Administration has been toward fair-housing
and de-segregation efforts. Its Departments of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) and Justice—the agencies primarily responsible
for enforcing the FHA23—have actively worked to turn back many of
the Obama years’ most progressive housing efforts;24 Trump has
appointed many federal judges hostile to civil rights;25 and he has
encouraged racial divisions that have coincided with an increase in racebased hate crimes.26
The book discounts these negative developments, arguing that “the
2016 election . . . has left long-term [pro-integration] trends

22.

The book describes an “inverted dual housing market” in which “the
relative housing surplus in black areas deters blacks from pioneering into
expensive, outlying white areas [while] the high levels of segregation deter
non-blacks from moving into black areas,” resulting in the “market
fail[ing] to produce the wide range of stably integrated areas that a vast
number of blacks and whites would like to live in.” Id. at 309; see also id.
at 421 (describing the problem of “market failure” as “the inverted dual
housing market”). A related question is why, given that “market failure”
means that black neighborhoods tend to be poor, see id. at 4, 394–97, the
authors are so optimistic that this—and the resulting segregation—will
change.

23.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(a), 3610–12, 3614a, 3616 (2012) (HUD); id.
§§ 3612(o), 3614 (Justice); see also infra note 39 (describing HUD’s
authority to issue FHA regulations).

24.

See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.

25.

See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Trump and Senate Republicans Celebrate Making
the Courts More Conservative, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/us/trump-senate-republicans-courts.html [https://
perma.cc/E9LK-44XU] (reporting that, in its first three years, the Trump
Administration placed forty-five conservative judges on the U.S. courts of
appeals, amounting to one-quarter of all such appellate judges, and that
the “the effect of [these] appointments in making decisions is already being
felt”). For a recent FHA example, see Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.
v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019) (Trump-appointee
Kurt D. Engelhardt wrote the majority opinion), petition for reh’g en
banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. __
(2020).

26.

See, e.g., Adeel Hassan, Hate-Crime Violence Hits 16-Year High, F.B.I.
Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
11/12/us/hate-crimes-fbi-report.html [https://perma.cc/CX4V-6QMA].
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undisturbed.”27 The authors reason that enforcement of the FHA and
other anti-discrimination laws is no longer the key to progress in this
field,28 which instead they view as virtually guaranteed by positive
demographic forces and an ever-growing acceptance of integration by
the American people.29 We shall see.

II. Reflections on Modern Exclusionary-Zoning Cases
A. Background: The Book’s Strategy #12 and an Overview of Relevant
FHA Law

The book’s last of twelve proposed integration strategies deals with
“[d]isparate impact litigation on zoning.”30 Here, the authors identify
the basic Supreme Court and appellate precedents that have addressed
zoning and other local land-use practices used to limit affordable
housing projects in white areas;31 describe in detail a 2000 Texas district
court case;32 suggest that the Justice Department “could become more
involved in bringing [such] suits,” at least if “political conditions
change” (i.e., after the Trump Administration);33 and conclude that,
although such litigation is often contentious and protracted and its
potential efficacy should not be over-estimated, “the stick of disparate
impact litigation” can be helpful in challenging particular “exclusionary
barriers within a metropolitan area.”34
The book is correct that exclusionary-zoning cases have been an
important part of FHA litigation ever since the statute’s earliest years.
Three theories of liability ultimately emerged in FHA-based cases
accusing municipalities of racial discrimination in blocking affordable

27.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 458.

28.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

29.

See supra note 10; Sander et al., supra note 1, at 307–08 (describing
the “[r]ising white tolerance for integration” as a “recurring theme of this
book” and as growing significantly stronger since the FHA’s enactment in
1968); see also id. at 398–402 (describing the steady increase in interracial
marriage since the 1960s and the growth in the number of Americans that
self-identified as multiracial in the recent decennial censuses).

30.

Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442. Much of an early chapter on
“Exclusionary Zoning and Structural Segregation” is devoted to state “fair
share” programs, see id. at 238–43, and the book’s eleventh suggested
policy strategy deals with this topic. See id. at 440–41.

31.

See Sander et al., supra note 1, at 442, 554 n.34.

32.

Id. at 442–43.

33.

Id. at 444.

34.

Id.
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housing projects.35 Obviously, a FHA claim could be based on
intentional discrimination, with the required proof of the defendant’s
illicit motivation being essentially the same as would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under the Supreme
Court’s 1977 decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation.36 In addition, two separate types of
discriminatory-effect claims—disparate-impact and segregative effect—
soon came to be recognized, primarily as a result of decisions by the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits in the 1970s37 and the Second Circuit's
1988 decision in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.38
Neither of these discriminatory-effect claims requires a showing of
illegal intent, and both were endorsed in a 2013 regulation promulgated
by HUD (“Current Rule”).39 Under the Current Rule, which was
35.

The three theories of liability described in the rest of this paragraph are
available in all FHA cases, not just those involving exclusionary-zoning
claims. There is, however, a distinction between these land-use cases and
all others under the FHA, at least insofar as HUD’s authority is
concerned. This is because Congress’s 1988 amendments to the FHA,
while mandating that the agency issue general FHA regulations, see
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed.
Reg. 3,231, 3,234 (Jan. 23, 1989), also required HUD to defer to the
Justice Department in handling exclusionary-zoning complaints. See 42
U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(C) (2012) (barring HUD from issuing a charge in any
FHA administrative complaint that “involves the legality of any State or
local zoning or other land use law or ordinance” and requiring that HUD
“immediately refer [such] matter to the Attorney General for appropriate
action under [§ 3614(b)(1)]”); see also 24 C.F.R. § 103.400(a)(3) (2019)
(setting forth HUD’s procedures for complying with this provision). As a
result, HUD’s FHA regulations have generally shied away from making
substantive pronouncements about this type of FHA case.

36.

See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264–71 (1977).

37.

See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1288–94 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974).

38.

Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–
38 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).

39.

See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (promulgating 24
C.F.R. § 100.500). As the agency primarily responsible for administering
the FHA, see 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2012), HUD’s regulations interpreting
the FHA are entitled to substantial deference. See Meyer v. Holley, 537
U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003). HUD’s commentary on its 2013 discriminatoryeffect regulation noted that the agency had long recognized both types of
discriminatory-effect claims under the FHA. See Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,461–62.
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designed in part to provide national uniformity in evaluating FHAeffect claims,40 both theories are subject to the same three-step burdenshifting proof scheme, with the plaintiff having the initial burden of
proving that the defendant’s challenged practice causes a
discriminatory effect.41
In 2015, the Supreme Court endorsed FHA disparate-impact claims
in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.,42 concluding that the disparate-impact
theory is a way of bolstering the FHA’s “continuing role in moving the
Nation toward a more integrated society.”43 Although Inclusive
Communities was not a traditional exclusionary-zoning case,44 the
Court recognized that FHA-outlawed practices “include zoning laws
and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude
minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient
justification.”45 According to Inclusive Communities, “[s]uits targeting
such practices reside at the heartland of disparate-impact liability,” a
proposition for which the Court cited Huntington and two other cases.46
Again citing Huntington, the Court noted that the disparate-impact
HUD is currently considering amendments to its discriminatory-effect
regulation. See infra Part II.C.2.
40.

See infra note 93.

41.

See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c). For a description of this three-step process,
see Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462.

42.

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).

43.

Id. at 2526. This conclusion was made in Inclusive Communities’
penultimate paragraph, which also recognized the FHA’s role “in our
Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation [and in] striving to
achieve our ‘historic commitment to creating an integrated society’” and
stated: “The FHA must play an important part in avoiding the Kerner
Commission’s grim prophecy that ‘[o]ur Nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.’” Id. at 2525
(citations omitted).

44.

See id. at 2522–25 (expressing skepticism about the plaintiff’s “novel”
claim in this case, which alleged that a state agency approved housing
proposals under the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program in a way
that resulted in most Dallas-area projects being located in poor,
predominantly black inner-city neighborhoods as opposed to white
suburban communities and which the Court characterized as challenging
new developments “in one location rather than another”).

45.

Id. at 2521–22.

46.

Id. at 2522; see also id. at 2519–20 (citing Huntington, Black Jack, and
the Seventh Circuit’s remand decision in Arlington Heights among the
appellate decisions that Congress in the FHA’s 1988 amendments
“accepted and ratified”).
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theory has allowed plaintiffs to vindicate the FHA’s objectives “by
stopping municipalities from enforcing arbitrary and, in practice,
discriminatory ordinances barring the construction of certain types of
housing units.”47
The Court in Inclusive Communities did not base its ruling on
HUD’s 2013 regulation, but the opinion did cite that regulation and
HUD’s commentary on it with apparent approval on three occasions.48
Inclusive Communities also set forth certain “cautionary standards” to
guard against improper FHA impact claims,49 which were similar to the
standards established in HUD’s regulation.50
B. Post-Inclusive Communities Commentary and Cases

After the Court decided Inclusive Communities, I wrote articles on
both the disparate-impact and segregative-effect theories of FHA
liability in light of that decision.51 Both articles included sections on
how the respective theories would apply to future exclusionary-zoning
cases,52 and indeed the segregative-effect article made the point that
this theory has been used almost exclusively in such cases.53
Within a year after Inclusive Communities, the Second and Ninth
Circuits produced major decisions involving FHA exclusionary-zoning
claims. The first was Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau,54
where the Second Circuit affirmed much of the plaintiffs’ victory in
challenging a white city’s opposition to a proposed 300-unit, mixedincome development whose likely tenants would include a substantial

47.

Id. at 2522.

48.

See id. at 2514–15, 2522–23.

49.

Id. at 2522–24.

50.

Both the Inclusive Communities opinion and the HUD regulation suggest
that FHA disparate-impact claims should be judged according to a threestep, burden-shifting analysis similar to the process for evaluating Title
VII employment-discrimination claims. See id. at 2522–24; 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500(c). For more on whether the standards set forth in Inclusive
Communities differ from those in HUD’s 2013 regulation, see infra note
84 and accompanying text.

51.

See Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709 (2017); Robert G.
Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing
Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
685 (2016).

52.

See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 749–51; Schwemm & Bradford, supra
note 51, at 751–60.

53.

See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 715, 735.

54.

819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
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number of minorities.55 The trial court in Mhany had ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs’ discriminatory intent claim and also found that the
defendant-city’s action had both a disparate impact on minorities and
a segregative effect.56 The Second Circuit upheld liability on the intent
claim,57 affirmed the findings below on the first two steps of the
discriminatory-effect analysis,58 and remanded for further proceedings
on the effect claim’s third element (i.e., whether the city’s legitimate
interests could be achieved by a “less discriminatory alternative”).59
Two days after Mhany, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in
Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma,60 which upheld the
plaintiffs’ intent-based claim challenging the defendant’s refusal to
rezone land for a moderately priced, predominantly Hispanic
development and also ruled that summary judgment should not have
been entered against their disparate-impact claim.61 With respect to the
former, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on allegations that the city
was influenced by neighbors’ race-based statements of opposition,62 a
55.

Id. at 590, 608–09, 624–25. Mhany was decided a few months after another
post-Inclusive Communities Second Circuit exclusionary-zoning decision,
Anderson Group, LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.
2015). In Anderson Group, the Second Circuit reinstated a jury verdict in
favor of an affordable housing developer that accused the defendant of
impact-based discrimination in blocking the plaintiff’s proposed project.
Id. at 38, 56. According to Anderson Group, the governing FHA legal
framework was based on the Second Circuit’s 1988 decision in Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). See Anderson Group, 805 F.3d at
49.

56.

See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 599, 617.

57.

Id. at 605-16.

58.

Id. at 616–20.

59.

Id. at 617-19. On remand, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs on this
point, see Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, No. 05-CV2301, 2017 WL 4174787, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), after which the
case ended with a multi-million-dollar settlement. See Settlement
Agreement at 3, Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau, No. 05CV-2301 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019), ECF 626-1; Recent Settlements, Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rep., at ¶4.7 (Apr. 2019) (reporting settlement
agreement that included $5,400,000 for the plaintiff-developer, $450,000
for other developers, $120,000 for a fair housing organization, and
attorney’s fees).

60.

818 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016).

61.

Id. at 496–97. The Ninth Circuit did, however, affirm the district court’s
granting of the defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs’
segregative-effect claim. Id. at 513.

62.

Id. at 504–07.
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factor that had also been persuasive in the Mhany case.63 As for the
impact claim, the appellate court held that the court below should not
have rejected this claim based on the availability of other modestly
priced housing in the area.64
These post-Inclusive Communities decisions provide further
support for using the FHA’s disparate-impact theory—and, to a lesser
extent, its segregative-effect theory—to challenge exclusionary-zoning
practices. Neither appellate court saw any significant difference between
how such a claim is evaluated under Inclusive Communities and the
HUD regulation,65 and indeed Mhany held that the HUD regulation
should supplant prior Second Circuit precedent governing the burden
of proof in an effect claim’s third step.66 Also, both decisions served as
reminders that intent-based claims can also succeed in this type of
case,67 in part because evidence of impact discrimination is relevant in
proving illicit intent68 and also because both the Second and Ninth
Circuits were willing to interpret hostile comments by neighbors about
the proposed development as code phrases for anti-minority
sentiments.69 Many of these same themes were also reinforced by district
court decisions in post-Inclusive Communities exclusionary-zoning
cases.70
63.

See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606–10.

64.

See Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 509-13. On remand, the trial court found
sufficient evidence to deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to the plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim, see Ave. 6E Investments, LLC
v. City of Yuma, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2017), after which
the case was settled. See Conditional Settlement and Release Agreement
at 2, 4, Ave. 6E Investments v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-CV-00297-JJT
(D. Ariz. June 11, 2019), ECF 343-1 (providing for settlement that
included $2,850,000 for the plaintiff-developer and rezoning of specified
parcels for future development of affordable housing).

65.

See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 618; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 512–13. The Ninth
Circuit did not discuss this issue in its analysis of the plaintiff’s disparateimpact claim, but the district court on remand regularly relied on the
HUD regulation in upholding this claim. See Ave 6E, 217 F. Supp. 3d at
1047 n.28, 1048 nn.34–35, 1050 n.50, 1051 n.55.

66.

Mhany, 819 F.3d at 617–19.

67.

See also 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444
F.3d 673, 678–85 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding, in a pre-Inclusive
Communities decision, that plaintiffs’ intent-based claim could proceed
while their impact-based claim failed); Mhany, 819 F.3d at 624.

68.

See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 507–08.

69.

See Mhany, 819 F.3d at 606–11; Ave. 6E, 818 F.3d at 503–07.

70.

See, e.g., Gilead Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Cromwell, No. 3:17-cv-627
(VAB), 2019 WL 7037795, at *21–25 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2019); Ave. 6E,
217 F. Supp. 3d at 1047–48.

703

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Reflections on Moving Toward Integration and Modern ExclusionaryZoning Cases Under the Fair Housing Act
C. The Trump Administration’s Attack on Fair Housing and
Exclusionary-Zoning Cases
1. Overview

As noted in Part I, Moving Toward Integration’s optimistic
conclusions take little account of the steps taken by the Trump
Administration to undercut fair-housing enforcement generally and to
limit race-based integration efforts and exclusionary-zoning suits in
particular.71 Along with the appointment of many federal judges hostile
to civil rights,72 these steps include:
• the Justice Department’s virtual refusal to file any race-based
or exclusionary-zoning cases under the FHA,73 and its general hostility
to the disparate-impact theory of liability under all civil-rights
statutes;74
• HUD’s attempt to delay its 2016 rule adjusting fair-market-rent
standards for the Housing Choice Voucher program, which was enjoined

71.

Critiques of the Trump Administration’s civil-rights record abound. For
an example focused on fair housing, see Stephen M. Dane, Fair Housing
Policy Under the Trump Administration, Hum. Rts., May 2019, at 18.

72.

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

73.

In the Trump Administration’s first three years, the Justice Department
filed about forty FHA cases, only three of which alleged anti-black
discrimination (two involving mortgage redlining by Midwest banks and
one (based on a HUD investigation and charge) challenging a California
town’s biased enforcement of its rental ordinance). See Civil Rights
Division Press Releases, Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/crt/
civil-rights-division-press-releases-speeches [https://perma.cc/A2Y2-NYWF]
(last visited May 27, 2020) (providing press releases for all filed cases). As
for race-based exclusionary-zoning cases, the Justice Department’s only
reported activity during this three-year period was to settle a case against
a Chicago suburb that had been filed during the Obama Administration.
See Justice Department Obtains $410,000 Settlement of Housing
Discrimination Lawsuit Against Tinley Park, Illinois, for Refusing to
Approve Low-Income Housing Development, Dep’t of Just. (Aug. 24,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-obtains-410000settlement-housing-discrimination-lawsuit-against-tinley [https://perma.cc/
P5GV-6B5A].

74.

See Laura Meckler & Devlin Barrett, Trump Administration Considers
Rollback of Anti-Discrimination Rules, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administrationconsiders-rollback-of-anti-discrimination-rules/2019/01/02/f96347ea-046d11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html [https://perma.cc/H6WR-UM57]
(reporting on a Justice Department memo that directed senior civil rights
officials to examine how decades-old disparate-impact regulations might
be changed or removed in their areas of expertise and noting that similar
action was being considered at HUD and other agencies).
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for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as a result of
privately initiated litigation;75
• HUD’s reversal of its 2015 regulations governing local
jurisdictions’ responsibilities to foster housing integration by
affirmatively furthering fair housing (“AFFH”), an effort that was
unsuccessfully challenged in court;76
• HUD’s proposed—and currently pending—changes to its FHA
discriminatory-effect regulation, which would substantially restrict
effect-based claims, as described below.77
The only potentially positive action taken by the Administration in
this field is a mostly rhetorical effort to reduce local-government
restrictions on affordable housing that, as of early 2020, had only
produced HUD’s announcement of a proposed regulation.78

75.

See Open Cmtys. All. v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148, 156–61, 179 (D.D.C.
2017). For a detailed description of the Housing Choice Voucher program
(also known as “Section 8”), see Schwemm, supra note 14, at 10–16.

76.

See Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14, 36, 66 (D.D.C.
2018) (ruling against APA-based challenge to HUD’s delay in implementing
its 2015 AFFH regulations). In early 2018, HUD suspended until 2025 the
obligation of most jurisdictions to submit the fair-housing assessments
mandated by the 2015 AFFH regulations.
In mid-2019, HUD announced its intent to “streamline” the AFFH
regulations, see Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing: Streamlining and
Enhancements, 84 Fed. Reg. 40,713, 40,715 (Aug. 16, 2019), and in early
2020, HUD published proposed new regulations. See Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,041, 2,041 (Jan. 14, 2020) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903, 905). Among other
things, this proposed rule would effectively eliminate consideration of race
and residential segregation from HUD’s assessment of whether its grantees
are fulfilling their FHA-affirmative obligations, see id. at 2,042, 2,044, and
local jurisdictions, though free to “undertake changes to zoning or landuse policies as one method of complying with the AFFH obligation,”
would not “have their certification questioned because they do not choose
to undertake zoning changes.” Id. at 2046.

77.

See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text.

78.

See White House Council on Eliminating Regulatory Barriers to
Affordable Housing; Request for Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 64,549, 64,549–
50 (Nov. 22, 2019) (requesting, pursuant to a mid-2019 Executive Order,
public comment by early 2020, “on Federal, State, local, and Tribal laws,
regulations, land use requirements, and administrative practices that
artificially raise the costs of affordable housing development and contribute
to shortages in housing supply”). For a critique of this effort by two senior
officials of the National Fair Housing Alliance, see Debby Goldberg &
Morgan Williams, Zoning Is Not the Answer to All Our Housing Problems,
THE HILL (Nov. 7, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civilrights [https://perma.cc/C28L-GPFU].
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2. HUD’s Proposed Changes to its Discriminatory-Effect Regulation

On August 19, 2019, HUD proposed major amendments to its
discriminatory-effect regulation (“Proposed Rule”).79 The proposed
amendments would eliminate any reference to the segregative-effect
theory of liability80 and, with respect to disparate-impact claims, would
require plaintiffs to allege five new elements in their complaint81 while
providing additional protections for defendants, including a series of
“safe harbors”82 and more favorable burdens of proof.83 HUD’s principal
rationale for these amendments was “to bring HUD’s disparate impact
rule into closer alignment with the analysis and guidance provided in
Inclusive Communities as understood by HUD.”84
79.

See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42,857 (Aug. 19, 2019) (to be codified at
24 C.F.R. pt. 100). The Proposed Rule also included changes to certain
other HUD-FHA regulations. See id. at 42,857 (noting that this rule also
proposes to “incorporate minor amendments to [24 C.F.R.] §§ 100.5,
100.7, 100.70, and 100.120”).

80.

See infra notes 103–110 and accompanying text.

81.

See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858. The five elements are:
(1) That the challenged policy or practice is arbitrary, artificial,
and unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective;
(2) That there is a robust causal link between the challenged
policy or practice and a disparate impact on members of a
protected class;
(3) That the challenged policy or practice has an adverse effect
on members of a protected class;
(4) That the alleged disparity caused by the policy or practice is
significant; and
(5) That there is a direct link between the disparate impact and
the complaining party’s alleged injury.
Id. at 42,858–59.

82.

See id. at 42,859 (to be codified under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)) (proposing
three new methods of defense).

83.

See id. at 42,860 (to be codified under 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)) (proposing
higher burden of proof for plaintiffs while giving defendants easier burden
to rebut plaintiff’s case).

84.

Id. at 42,857; see also id. at 42,854 (noting that the proposed amendments
are designed to “better reflect the Supreme Court’s 2015 rule in [Inclusive
Communities]”); id. at 42,861 (opining that the Current Rule needs
extensive changes because courts and the public are “forced to reconcile
how to implement HUD’s regulations consistent with Inclusive Communities”
and a new rule would provide clarity and allow entities to avoid “the need
to research and compile case law since Inclusive Communities”).
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The Proposed Rule provided for a two-month comment period,85
during which HUD received over 45,000 comments, many critical.86
HUD is obligated under the Administrative Procedure Act to consider
these comments,87 which means that the agency will be hard pressed to
issue a final rule for many months.88 Still, a Trump Administration
priority has been to narrow the FHA’s effect theory,89 and HUD seems
likely to adopt a final rule by the end of 2020.90 To the extent that the
final rule is similar to the Proposed Rule, it will likely face an APAbased court challenge91 and, depending on the results of the 2020
HUD’s view that the Current Rule is substantially inconsistent with
Inclusive Communities is at odds with most post-Inclusive Communities
cases. See National Fair Housing Alliance, Comment Letter on HUD’s
Proposed Rule 49–56 (Oct. 18, 2019), available at https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3079 (gathering cases); see, e.g.,
Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016)
(stating that “[t]he Supreme Court implicitly adopted HUD’s [Current
Rule]” in Inclusive Communities); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank of
America, N.A., 401 F. Supp. 3d 619, 631 (D. Md. 2019) (describing
Inclusive Communities as “[h]ewing closely” to the Current Rule); Prop.
Cas. Insurers Assoc. of Am. v. Carson, No. 12-cv-10456, 2017 WL
2653069, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2017) (noting that “the Supreme Court
in Inclusive Communities . . . did not identify any aspect of HUD’s
[Current Rule] that required correction”).
85.

See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,854.

86.

See Businesses, Policymakers, Advocates, Experts Submit Thousands of
Comments Opposing HUD’s Attack on Core Civil Rights Tool, Nat’l
Fair Housing Alliance (Oct. 23, 2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/
2019/10/23/businesses-policymakers-advocates-experts-submit-thousands-ofcomments-opposing-huds-attack-on-core-civil-rights-tool/ [https://perma.cc/
4WTH-AAJJ].

87.

See, e.g., Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, 66 F. Supp. 3d
1018, 1048–51 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing, inter alia, Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

88.

By way of comparison, it took HUD about fifteen months to finalize its
discriminatory-effect rule after it proposed the rule, a process that
included having to consider less than 100 public comments. See
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463–64 (Feb. 15, 2013).

89.

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

90.

HUD’s latest regulatory plan called for final action on the Proposed Rule
in April 2020. Dept. Hous. & Urban Dev., RIN No. 2529-AA98,
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate
Impact Standard, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain
[https://perma.cc/PJA4-JMEZ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).

91.

Cf. Open Cmty. All. v. Carson, 286 F. Supp. 3d 148 (D.D.C. 2017) (ruling
on APA-based challenge to new HUD rule dealing with housing program);
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presidential election, may be revoked or substantially changed by HUD
in a new administration.
3. The Proposed Rule’s Potential Effect on Exclusionary-Zoning
Litigation

If something like the Proposed Rule does become final, what effect
will it have on future FHA exclusionary land-use litigation? As noted
above, HUD has generally avoided any attempt to regulate such
litigation on the ground that the statute gives enforcement authority in
these cases to the Justice Department,92 but both the Proposed Rule
and its predecessor purport to govern all types of FHA claims93 and
thus apply to FHA claims in court as well as in administrative actions
before HUD.94
Clearly, the Proposed Rule would make exclusionary-zoning cases
much more difficult for plaintiffs to win. As commentators on this rule
have noted, its new disparate-impact pleading requirements might have

Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Carson, 330 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2018) (same).
For more on these cases, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
92.

See supra note 35.

93.

For examples of exclusionary-zoning cases that have relied on the Current
Rule, see Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618–619
(2d Cir. 2016); Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1040, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2017). See also Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,472 (noting
that one of the purposes of the Current Rule was to establish “uniform
standards” for FHA discriminatory-effect cases in order to “simplify this
type of litigation”).

94.

Both rules explicitly purport to apply to the parties in a court case
(“plaintiff” and “defendant”) as well as those in an administrative
proceeding (“charging party” and “respondent”). See Implementation of
the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,855,
42,862–63 (Aug. 19, 2019) (proposing 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)–(d)); id. at
42,859 (commenting that the defenses proposed in amended 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500(c) may be raised “through a variety of procedural motions,”
such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment under,
respectively, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56)); Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,482 (“The charging party, with respect to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
3612, or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
3613 or 3614, has the burden of [proving Step One]”); id. at 11,474
(commenting on the ability of “plaintiffs or complainants” to demonstrate
Step Three through Rule 26(b)(1) discovery); see also supra notes 65, 70
(giving examples of court cases that have applied the Current Rule).
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derailed even some of the classic “heartland” exclusionary-zoning cases
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities.95
The Proposed Rule would also negatively affect these cases in other
ways, two of which are particularly noteworthy.96 First, in limiting
disparate-impact claims to those that challenge “policies or practices”
as opposed to “single events,” HUD explicitly identifies “a local
government’s zoning decision” as being in the latter, inappropriate
category.97 The basic “policy” requirement is derived from dicta in
95.

See Justin Steil et al., M.I.T. Dep’t of Urban Studies and Planning,
Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard 7 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3331 [https://perma.cc/6D75-Q28C]; see
also 154 Law Professors, Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of
the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard 2 (Oct. 18, 2019)
(concluding that, with respect to “exclusionary land use rules and other
policies that perpetuate segregation, . . . [HUD’s Proposed Rule] strips
plaintiffs of this necessary, congressionally-intended tool by making
disparate impact claims nearly impossible to bring”); Calvin Bradford,
Comment Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard 35 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=HUD-2019-0067-3437 [https://perma.cc-9DZZ-HJX5]
(concluding, in comments by an experienced expert witness in disparateimpact cases, that the Proposed Rule’s imposition of “new and unjustified
burdens of proof on the plaintiffs” and “safe harbors” for defendants
amounts to “an attack on the very theory [of disparate-impact liability
as] supported in the case law and in the [Inclusive Communities]
decision”).

96.

In addition to the two examples described in the text, the Proposed Rule
would limit disparate-impact claims to challenging practices that
“actually” (as opposed to “actually or predictably”) result in a
discriminatory effect, by deleting the portion of the Current Rule stating
that a practice has a discriminatory effect “where it actually or
predictably results” in a disparate impact. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a)
(2017); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,468 (finding that actions that
“predictably” result in discriminatory effects should be covered). The
Current Rule’s position is supported by many exclusionary-zoning
decisions, including one then cited by HUD to support this point that was
later described by the Supreme Court as a “heartland” disparate-impact
case. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (citing United States v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)).

97.

See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858 (stating that the plaintiff’s burden of identifying a
“particular policy or practice that causes the disparate impact” will
generally not be met by “alleging that a single event—such as a local
government’s zoning decision or a developer’s decision to construct a new
building in one location instead of another—is the cause of a disparate
impact, unless the plaintiff can show that the single decision is the
equivalent of a policy or practice”) (emphasis added).
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Inclusive Communities,98 but HUD’s gratuitous extension of it to
immunize most zoning decisions99 is actually inconsistent with Inclusive
Communities’ endorsement of key exclusionary-zoning precedents,100
with post-Inclusive Communities cases,101 and with modern land-use
practices.102

98.

See Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (noting that “a plaintiff
challenging the decision of a private developer to construct a new building
in one location rather than another will not easily be able to show this is
a policy causing a disparate impact because such a one-time decision may
not be a policy at all”).

99.

The only example given in Inclusive Communities of a plaintiff
inappropriately challenging a “single decision” as opposed to a “policy”
was “the decision of a private developer to construct a new building in
one location rather than another.” See id. at 2523.

100. See id. at 2519 (citing with approval exclusionary-zoning decisions that
involved FHA challenges to municipalities’ refusal to rezone a specific
parcel for a particular project).
101. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d
Cir. 2016) (holding that the complaint here “about a [rezoning] decision
affecting one piece of property . . . falls well within a classification of a
‘general policy’” susceptible to a disparate-impact challenge); Ave. 6E
Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-CV-00297 JWS, 2018 WL 582314,
at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2018) (noting, in upholding disparate-impact
challenge to a one-time zoning decision, that “not all one-time decisions
are equal” and that “[i]t is the type and effect of the decision that dictates
whether it can be subject to a disparate impact claim”).
HUD’s commentary on this point does not acknowledge Mhany or Ave.
6E, but instead relies on a single non-zoning trial-court decision. See
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84
Fed. Reg. at 42,858 n.37 (citing Barrow v. Barrow, No. 16-11493-FDS,
2017 WL 2872820, at *2–3 (D. Mass. July 5, 2017) (dismissing pro se
plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim in dispute among siblings over the terms
of a will and the devise of their mother’s property)).
102. For a detailed exposition of this point, see N.Y.U. Furman Center, Comment
Letter on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate
Impact Standard at 17–23 (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.furmancenter.org/
files/2019-10-17_Disparate_Impact_Comments_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc-894D-P8MK] (describing contemporary land-use regulation as
“a highly discretionary process characterized by individualized decisions,”
noting that the federal government has regularly recognized that most
land-use decisions “now include a discretionary component involving
individual decisions,” and concluding that the Proposed Rule’s exclusion
of single-zoning decisions from the FHA’s disparate-impact coverage
“would foreclose review of many, and perhaps most, land use decisions—
no matter how arbitrary or unjustified”).
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Second, the Proposed Rule deletes any reference to the FHA’s
“segregative-effect” theory of liability,103 whose primary value has been
in challenging exclusionary-zoning practices.104 Although HUD provides
no justification for this change, it is presumably intended to align the
discrimination-effect regulation with Inclusive Communities,105 which
only dealt with and endorsed the disparate-impact theory.106 Whatever
HUD’s motivation here, its abandonment of the segregative-effect
theory reverses the agency’s long-held position.107 Moreover, it ignores
decades of cases recognizing this theory,108 not to mention Inclusive
103. Compare Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,855 (Aug. 19, 2019) (providing, at 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.500, that FHA liability may be established “based on a specific
policy’s or practice’s discriminatory effect on members of a protected
class”), with Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (providing, at 24
C.F.R. § 100.500(a), that FHA liability may exist where a practice results
in “a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases,
reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race [or
other prohibited factor]”) (emphasis added).
104. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Among the advantages of the
segregative-effect theory in exclusionary-zoning cases is that it, unlike the
disparate-impact theory, may challenge a particular action or one-time
decision as well as a “policy.” See Schwemm, supra note 51, at 736–38;
supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. According to HUD’s
commentary on this aspect of the Proposed Rule, the key part of the
regulation “would be slightly amended to reflect the removal of a
definition for discriminatory effect.” Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858.
106. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–25 (2015) (dealing only with the
question of whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the
FHA).
107. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469. When an agency makes such a change, the APA
requires that it “display awareness that it is changing position” and
provide a “detailed justification” for the change. See FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); accord Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing that practices leading to the “perpetuation of segregation”
violate the FHA); Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP,
488 U.S. 15, 17 (1988) (affirming that the Second Circuit properly found
disparate impact when a town’s practices “significantly perpetuated
segregation in the Town”); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,469 & n.102
(noting FHA cases endorsing this theory spanning nearly five decades).
See generally Schwemm, supra note 51, at 715–36 (describing cases).
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Communities’ endorsement of many of these cases109 and post-Inclusive
Communities cases that have continued to rely on this theory.110
More generally, this aspect of the Proposed Rule reflects HUD’s
current indifference to the FHA’s role in fostering integration. In
deleting all but one tangential reference to segregation,111 the Proposed
Rule ignores the agency’s and the courts’ longstanding recognition of
the FHA’s integration goals and Inclusive Communities’ powerful
statements about the FHA’s importance as a tool for combating
residential segregation.112
109. See Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2519, 2522 (citing these cases
regularly and recognizing “perpetuating segregation” as a basis for FHA
liability).
110. See, e.g., Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619–20
(2d Cir. 2016); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 401 F. Supp.
3d 619, 640–41 (D. Md. 2019); Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 20, 34 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Ave. 6E Invs. v. City
of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that, after Inclusive
Communities, the FHA “forbids actions by private or governmental bodies
that create a discriminatory effect upon a protected class or perpetuate
housing segregation without any concomitant legitimate reason”).
111. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standards, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 42857 (Aug. 19, 2019) (proposing to
amend an example of unlawful behavior in the FHA steering-and-services
regulation adopted by HUD in 1989 [24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a)]). The
Proposed Rule would add to this regulation’s final example “procedures,
building codes, [and] permitting rules,” so that the new version outlaws
“[e]nacting or implementing land-use rules, ordinances, procedures,
building codes, permitting rules, policies or requirements” that restrict
housing opportunities on a prohibited basis. See id. at 42,862 (proposing
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(5)) (emphasis added). It thus would extend the
current regulation’s prohibitions to include the italicized techniques to the
land-use rules, ordinances, and other elements that are already included
in § 100.700(d)(5). According to HUD, this proposed addition is simply
“for clarity in connection with the changes HUD is making” in its
discriminatory-effect regulation. Id. at 42,857.
112. See Stacy Seicshnaydre, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for HUD’s
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standards 2
(Oct. 18, 2019). According to Professor Seicshnaydre's analysis, HUD’s
2013 commentary on the Current Rule made thirty-eight references to
segregation and ten references to integration and the Inclusive
Communities opinion made six references to segregation, three references
to integration, and additional references to racial isolation. See id.; see
also Inclusive Communities, 135 S.Ct. at 2522 (noting that the FHA’s
disparate-impact theory curbs practices that “arbitrarily creat[e]
discriminatory effects or perpetuat[e] segregation”); id. at 2550–51 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (noting, in the principal dissent, that the “the ‘purpose’
driving the Court’s analysis” is “[t]he desire to eliminate the ‘vestiges’ of
‘residential segregation by race’”); supra note 43 and accompanying text
(providing additional examples of the Inclusive Communities opinion’s
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Given the strong judicial support for the segregative-effect theory,
HUD’s abandonment of it in the Proposed Rule may simply be ignored
by the courts. There is also reason to suppose that courts will not follow
HUD’s proposed restrictions on pleading disparate-impact claims,
because federal agencies do not have the authority to set such
standards.113
For example, the Proposed Rule purports to establish a heightened
pleading standard for FHA disparate-impact claims by setting forth five
new “elements” of a prima facie case that a plaintiff must plead,114 but
HUD lacks the power to do this. Federal-court pleading standards are
set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”115 Courts do not have authority to impose more exacting

recognition of the FHA’s integration goal). By contrast, the Proposed
Rule makes only one reference to segregation and no references to
integration. See Seicshnaydre, supra.
113. See generally Olatunde Johnson et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
for HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact
Standards 1 (Oct. 18, 2019) (opining that the Proposed Rule may violate
the APA by, inter alia, addressing “matters beyond the FHA; specifically,
to evidentiary and procedural issues as they may arise in cases brought
under the FHA in federal or state courts”). The judiciary need not defer
to HUD’s position on such matters, because they involve areas of law
(e.g., court procedural rules) for which the agency has no authority to
administer. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984) (limiting judicial deference to an “agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers”).
114. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (setting forth these elements);
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standards,
84 Fed. Reg. at 42,859 (proposing that defendants may assert the absence
of any of these elements in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
115. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Satisfying this standard requires a plaintiff to
assert facts that make the claim “plausible.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). This is generally not difficult in FHA cases. See, e.g., City of
Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1271, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019),
vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1259 (2020); Reyes v. Waples Mobile
Home Park Ltd. P’ship, 903 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2026 (2019); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403–07
(7th Cir. 2010); cases cited infra note 120.
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requirements beyond this standard,116 and certainly agencies do not.117
Nor does HUD have any power to govern pleading requirements in state
courts, which may entertain FHA claims,118 including those involving
effect-based challenges to exclusionary zoning.119 In addition, the
Proposed Rule conflates prima-facie and burden-shifting standards with
pleading standards, which courts have consistently not allowed in postInclusive Communities discriminatory-effect cases.120
The fact that much of the Proposed Rule may ultimately be ignored
by the courts, however, does not mean that HUD’s effort here will not
harm plaintiffs in future exclusionary-zoning cases. Litigants and courts
in these cases will, at the least, have to struggle with a burdensome set
of preliminary issues created by the Proposed Rule. Thus, unlike the
Current Rule, which was designed to bring needed uniformity to FHA

116. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“A
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that
‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation.’”) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)).
The federal rules may be amended only pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–74 (2012).
117. Cf. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a federal regulation requiring banks to withhold certain documents
from discovery was “plainly inconsistent” with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governing discovery and thus “cannot be enforced” in the
absence of an enabling statute “more specific than a general grant of
authority”).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2012).
119. See, e.g., Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323,
337–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); cf. Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v.
Kargman, 48 N.E.3d 394, 406–14 (Mass. 2016) (dealing with FHA-effect
claim in non-zoning context); Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners
Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1280–85 (Ind. 2008) (same).
120. See, e.g., Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, No. 18 CV
839, 2019 WL 5963633, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2019); Washington
v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 16CV3948ENVSMG,
2019 WL 5694102, at *21–22 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019); Nat’l Fair Hous.
All. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 401 F. Supp. 3d 619, 634–38 (D. Md. 2019);
Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 940,
947–48 (N.D. Cal. 2018); County of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc.,
314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Winfield v. City of New
York, No. C 15-5236, 2016 WL 6208564, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016)
(noting that “a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, . . . not a
pleading requirement” and that Inclusive Communities “did not alter the
plausibility standard for pleading, which requires only the plaintiff plead
allegations that plausibly give rise to an inference that the challenged
policy causes a disparate impact”).
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discriminatory-effect claims,121 the Proposed Rule is likely to split courts
and add new uncertainty in this area.122 Moving Toward Integration
already notes that FHA exclusionary-zoning litigation has limited
“potential efficacy . . . for practical reasons,”123 and having an
oppositional federal government certainly does not make it any easier.

Conclusion
A recurring question in Moving Toward Integration is whether the
Fair Housing Act and its enforcement through litigation have been of
significant value in reducing housing discrimination and thereby
increasing residential integration. This question has also animated
much of my career. Lawyers tend to assume that law influences
behavior. There is, however, surprising little empirical research to
support this proposition. There is even less research on why people
choose to obey or disobey a particular law, as I discovered some years
ago when I examined why rental discrimination rates were continuing
at such high levels decades after the FHA’s enactment.124
The book’s basic answer is that early FHA enforcement was
effective in ending institutional resistance to race-based housing
discrimination, opening the way for substantial increases in integration;
thus continued effective enforcement is now less important because the
pro-integration forces unleashed in earlier decades virtually ensure
future desegregation.125 I am skeptical about a number of these
propositions.
I do agree, however, that the FHA has had a profoundly positive
impact on the Nation’s integration efforts. Without knowing exactly
how this has happened, it is clear that the public’s acceptance of housing
integration has greatly increased over the FHA’s fifty years and that
121. See supra note 93.
122. See Nat’l Fair Housing Alliance, supra note 84, at 56 (opposing the
Proposed Rule in part because it “would inject inconsistencies and
uncertainty into existing law”); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of
Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing, in the course of
upholding FHA discriminatory-effect challenge to town’s zoning decision,
that “other circuits have described the distinction between a single
isolated decision and a practice as ‘analytically unmanageable [because]
almost any repeated course of conduct can be traced back to a single
decision’”) (quoting Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps.,
AFL-CIO v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1992)).
123. Sander et al., supra note 1, at 444.
124. See Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (and
What Can Be Done about It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 489–90
(2007).
125. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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this is now a powerful force in itself, wholly apart from legal sanctions.
Those of us who were alive when the FHA was passed remember its
opponents saying, “You can’t legislate morals,” and “A law can’t
change people’s minds,” but clearly this is not true. Most Americans
today have known only a country where fair housing is the law of the
land, and most of these people take for granted that the FHA’s antidiscrimination mandate is a core principle of our country.
It is sobering to remember, however, that the history of civil rights
in the United States is not one of inevitable steady progress. For
example, the advances made in the aftermath of the Civil War were
soon followed by decades of Jim Crow. Backsliding is always possible.
And today, a good deal of race-based housing discrimination remains,
not only in practices that negatively impact minorities but in those
prompted by intentional bias.126 Further, as outlined in Part II above,
the Trump Administration has actively pursued a reactionary path to
civil rights and race relations, blatantly encouraging racial divisions and
hostility to integration.127
Thus, I believe—in contrast to the book—that vigorous
enforcement of the FHA continues to be important, both to expose
racism and deter discrimination and to encourage positive public
attitudes toward the FHA’s integration goals. Such enforcement has
always depended primarily on private groups and people. Whatever the
post-Trump era brings in terms of federal FHA enforcement, the Nation
will continue to have to rely on these private efforts to help ensure
future residential de-segregation.

126. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. And while some of these
intent-based practices are hidden in code words or are otherwise covert,
see supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text, others are explicit and
blatant, see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Graham, HUD
Office of Hearings and Appeals No. 19-JM-0014-FH-002 (HUD ALJ Jan.
6, 2020), modified in part on other grounds, (HUD Secretary Feb. 5, 2020)
(finding FHA violation based on landlord’s racist statement to black
prospect).
127. See supra Part II.C.1; see also supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
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